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In the field of military theory, the operational level of war (also called the operational art, as derived from (ロシア語:оперативное искусство), or the operational warfare) represents the level of command that coordinates the minute details of tactics with the overarching goals of strategy.〔p.24, Simpkin〕 During the 18th and early 19th centuries the synonymous term grand tactics was often applied to describe the manoeuvring of troops not tactically engaged, while in the late 19th century and beyond the First World War the term minor strategy was also in use〔p.218, Jablonsky〕 through the Second World War by some military commentators.〔p.28, Whitman〕 The confusion over terminology was brought up in professional military publications that sought to identify "...slightly different shades of meaning, such as tactics, major tactics, minor tactics, grand strategy, major strategy, and minor strategy".〔p.3, Bundel〕 Operational mobility, beginning as a concept during the period of the mechanisation of armed forces, became a method of managing the movement of forces by strategic commanders from the staging area to their Tactical Area of Responsibility.〔p.64, National Research Council Staff〕 ==History== At first, the operational level of war was conceived by the military theorists to describe the movement and logistics necessary for the coordinated concentration of many units for an offensive. Operational warfare is considered on a large enough scale that the tactical factors, such as line-of-sight and the time of day, are not recognizable, but smaller than the strategic scale, where production, politics, and diplomacy come into play. Formations are of the operational level if they are able to conduct operational movement on their own, that is operating independently, and are of sufficient size to be directly handled or have a significant impact on the enemy's decision-making at the strategic level of the military campaign or even the war. These methods of conducting operational mobility were pioneered by the German Army during the First World War and collaboratively developed with the Soviet Red Army in the late 1920s and 1930s by Mikhail Tukhachevsky who began to develop the concept between 1925 and 1929 as the basis of the Red Army's new field manual for the conduct of war. It was significantly tested and improved during the World War II by the Wehrmacht during the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, and by the Red Army for much of the rest of the war after the Battle for Moscow. What constitutes the operational level has changed with the size and function of armies. During the Second World War, an operational-level formation was typically a corps or army. Curiously, the term was not widely used in the United States or Britain before 1980–1981, when it became much discussed and started to enter military doctrines and officer combat training courses.〔p. 111, Stone〕 In part, it was popularised by its use in computer games, such as ''The Operational Art of War''. With the increase in combat power of individual units during the Cold War era, an operational-level formation became a mechanised division, and in the post-Cold War, the combat power of relatively small formations is today as great as that wielded by larger formations in the past. A brigade of some 6,000 personnel has emerged among many militaries (notably the United States Army) as an operational-level formation, replacing the division. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operational level of war」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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